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The Paradoxes of Religion in Gabrielle
Suchon
Véronique Desnain
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Gabrielle Suchon’s reliance on religious texts and authorities to support and
legitimise the arguments she makes in her two texts Traité de la morale et de la
politique (1693) and Du célibat volontaire (1700) has sometimes been per-
ceived as running contrary to its defence of female freedom. Suchon’s use
of religious texts will be examined here as a corner stone of her attack on
male hegemony and crucial to her argument, which rests in large part on
the distinction between divine law and social customs. The article will
focus specifically on how Suchon uses the paradoxes and contradictions
found in her extensive corpus of references to advance the notion that the
subjugation of women is a political strategy to support male power rather
than the result of a natural and divinely ordained hierarchy of genders.
keywords Suchon, religion, gender, philosophy, celibacy, vocation
Gabrielle Suchon’s two treatises represent the most extensive and coherent analysis of
their time on the condition of women in France. The Traité de la morale et de la poli-
tique (1693), in particular, addresses many of the points debated throughout the quer-
elle des femmes and rationally attacks male discourse and hegemony, whileDu célibat
volontaire (1700)1 proposes a new social status for women, distinct from matrimony
and religious orders, the only two uncontroversial and socially condoned paths for
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &
Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/),
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
1 G. S. Aristophile [Gabrielle Suchon], Traité de la morale et de la politique, divisé en trois parties. Sçavoir La
liberté, La Science et L’Autorité ou l’on voit que les personnes du Sexe pour en être privées, ne laissent pas
d’avoir une capacité Naturelle, qui les en peut rendre participantes (Paris: Certe,1693); Gabrielle Suchon,Du
Célibat volontaire ou La Vie sans engagement (Paris: Guignard, 1700).
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women at the time.2 Female freedom, as conceived by Suchon, is predicated on a reli-
gious stance both in its genesis and in its raison d’être. Yet some of the critics who have
looked in depth at Gabrielle Suchon’s œuvre have expressed surprise, unease or disap-
pointment about the fact that Suchon’s apparently orthodox attachment to religion is
at the forefront of her argument. Christine Fauré, for example, states that ‘contre toute
attente, c’est dans le sillage des Pères de l’Église que Suchon situait sa réflexion.’3 This
‘contre toute attente’ is in itself surprising given the predominance of religion in both
contemporary social life and in the whole debate around women’s attributes and place
in society. It also chooses to foreground one (‘Les Pères de l’Eglise’) of the many auth-
orities Suchon calls upon to support and articulate her examination of, and attack on,
the subjugation of women. As we will see, not all of these are religious, and of those
which are, not all are as orthodox as Fauré’s statement would have us believe, firstly
because not all patristic sources were deemed orthodox, and secondly because
notions of what is considered orthodox at the time can be quite fluid. What may be
surprising is that on some subjects Suchon is closer to more modern developments
within the Church than to the Fathers she cites, while at other times, she uses patristic
texts to counter modern interpretations. Her stance on celibacy, for example, can be
seen to be aligned with that of the Council of Trent (December 1545 to December
1563) which issued among its decrees of marriage a canon which condemned the
claim that the married state was superior to celibacy and asserted the excellence of
the celibate state. Social mores, however, were not necessarily in line with such devel-
opments and, as we will see, the tension between social and spiritual practices and
requirements are at the heart of Suchon’s writing.
Despite this, critics’ focus on the supposed submission of the author to ancient
religious sources is not unique, and it ignores both the variety of sources Suchon
calls upon and the use she makes of them. Paul Hoffmann, her most virulent
critic, accuses her of ‘fidéisme’, arguing that her work ultimately recommends sub-
mission to the established order.4 Most recognise the shortcomings of this perspec-
tive: Pierre Ronzeaud, first of all, who responds directly to Hoffmann5 and Séverine
Auffret, for example, who states, in her introduction to her modern edition of parts
of Suchon’s Traité, that:
Philosophe mal appréciée de son temps, pour avoir pensé à partir du sexe et du genre,
Gabrielle Suchon ne l’est guère plus de notre modernité; à cause, cette fois, de son chris-
tianisme, étant sous-entendu que sa perspective de croyance ferait, plus qu’un rationa-
lisme laïque, obstacle aux visées féminines d’émancipation.6
2 While widows benefitted from a degree of personal autonomy and financial independence, patriarchal cul-
tural practices often challenged their legal rights in a way that did not apply to unmarried men. See, for
example, Julie Hardwick, ‘Widowhood and Patriarchy in Seventeenth-Century France,’ Journal of Social
History, 26.1 (1992), 133–48.
3 Christine Fauré, La Démocratie sans les femmes: essai sur le libéralisme en France (Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France, 1985), p. 128.
4 Paul Hoffmann, ‘Le féminisme spirituel de Gabrielle Suchon,’ in Dix-septième siècle, 121 (1978), 269–76
(p. 272).
5 Pierre Ronzeaud, ‘Note sur l’article de Paul Hoffmann,’ in Dix-septième Siècle, 121 (1978), 276–77.
6 Séverine Auffret, ‘Introduction,’ in Gabrielle Suchon, Traité de la morale et de la politique: La Contrainte,
ed. by Séverine Auffret, (Paris: des femmes, 1988), pp. 20–21.
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She concludes that ‘tous ces textes, citations, références sont autant de soutiens
symboliques. Déférence, fidélité et respect du texte deviennent des impératifs méth-
odologiques pour conquérir une certaine autorité philosophique.’7
It is true that Suchon appears to set, in the ‘Préface générale’ of the Traité, what
we could call a ‘hierarchy of trustworthiness’ for her sources, starting with the Bible
and ending with ‘les Auteurs Modernes’, via ‘les savants tant Saints que profanes.’8
As Auffret notes, Suchon’s project is ‘philosophical’ and the recourse to ‘authorities’
is often strategic.9 Seeing it only as a strategy, though, risks considering the use of
religious texts only in relation to its role in an otherwise secular and strictly social
feminist stratagem, and only accepts the ambiguous aspects of Suchon’s argumen-
tation as necessary compromises, rather than as a genuine attempt to reconcile the
author’s own beliefs with her social context. The paradox here is that these beliefs
can be both grounded in faith and at odds with the dominant religious narrative. As
Auffret points out:
l’Église de Gabrielle Suchon diffère passablement de celle des prélats, des autorités qui
se donnent la puissance de contentions matérielles, de clôtures, de gestes et de rituels
extérieurs: Église toute spirituelle, constamment référée à ses origines primitives, se
devant d’entériner le principe de liberté qui “n’est autre chose que la raison humaine.”10
While it may at first appear that she is assenting to the Church’s position, close
analysis of her arguments reveals that Suchon also provides a number of points
which subvert it. Nowhere does this appear more clearly than in the chapters of
the Traité, in which she addresses the issue of women hearing confession. Her argu-
ment starts with a somewhat disingenuous acknowledgement that ‘L’Église a très
justement ordonné le contraire’11 but she proceeds to present the reasons for
which women are entirely suitable for such a role, concluding: ‘Les femmes ne
sont pas si dénuées des talents nécessaires à la conduit des âmes qu’on le
pretend.’12 What’s more, in developing her argument, she foregrounds the benefits
that would arise from permitting women to exercise such functions, such as sparing
men from importune questions and allowing women to support each other spiri-
tually. In support of her stance she paraphrases (and acknowledges as her source)
Saint Bernard to assert that, ‘elles ne seraient pas contraintes de commettre leurs
secrets aux lèvres et à la puissance d’autrui,’ thus opposing patristic authority to
contemporary religious authorities, and demonstrating that her relationship to
her sources, and in particular to religious ones, may be rather more complex
than previously suggested.13
This article proposes that Suchon’s reliance on religious texts may be the fruit not
only of her historical context and of the nature of dominant discourses on women,
but also of genuine faith. Suchon establishes a clear distinction between faith and
7 Auffret, p. 42
8 ‘Préface Générale,’ n.p.
9 Auffret, pp. 12 and 23–24.
10 Auffret, p. 21.
11 ‘De l’autorité,’ Traité, p. 82.
12 Ibid, p. 85.
13 Ibid, p. 82.
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the church as a ‘man-made’ institution (‘il faut toujours séparer l’autorité divine de
la malice du coeur humain’).14 As pointed out by Rachel Paine:
It is clear from her critique of established religion that her Christian faith excludes the
conventional ways of expressing one’s love of God, challenging the Scholastic dogma of
the time. She describes the convent as a social institution designed to keep women in a
subservient position, with virtues such as chastity, modesty and piety encouraged only
as a means of social control.15
As a widely read scholar, she is also clearly aware that many religious texts, being by
necessity interpretations, are also subject to historical and geographical relativity, to
which she refers specifically in the chapters on the ‘Privation d’Autorité’. As she
puts it, ‘Il y a d’autres Lois et Ordonnances de l’Eglise qui s’accommodent aux
mœurs et aux coutumes différentes des diverses Nations qui la reçoivent pour
Mère,’16 adding later, ‘Ces lois sont variables et ne durent qu’un temps, parce
qu’elles changent selon les Magistrats, les Maîtres, et les Supérieurs qui ne sont
pas toujours les mêmes’.17 To this relativism, she opposes the ultimate authority:
God’s plan. As Julie Walsh succinctly puts it:
God does nothing in vain. This is a powerful statement and one that Suchon deftly
wields in her discussion of freedom in T[raité de la] M[orale et de la] Politique. She ulti-
mately uses the fact that divine action is end-directed to ground the point that restricting
women’s ability to act in a way that is consistent with her rational nature is not only bad
or unjust but against God and nature.18
Far from being a form of fidéisme then, the references to a variety of religious
sources offer a wealth of contradictions and paradoxes, which Suchon exploits to
support her arguments, noting in her ‘Préface Générale’ that such an approach is
also supported by some of the Saints Pères:
St Bernard, parlant des écritures sacrées nous assure qu’on les peut expliquer en divers sens,
sans commettre aucune absurdité. Quelle raison peut-on avoir pour trouver mauvais que
les saintes lettres, les livres des Pères, et des auteurs graves soient appliqués différemment
pourvu que l’on suive toujours la foi Catholique et orthodoxe, puisque les choses matéri-
elles sont propres à divers usages et servent à plusieurs et différentes fonctions [?]
The question ‘quelles raisons peut-on avoir?’ is somewhat disingenuous but sets
the stage for Suchon to prove that such reasons have little to do with religion
and much to do with preserving male hegemony. It should be noted that she
uses a similar strategy in her treatment of Ancient secular authorities. The
14 ‘De l’autorité,’ Traité, p. 5. The chapters on ‘La dépendance dans les choses spirituelles’ (XIII and XIV of
this volume), for example, level some extremely harsh accusations at priests and other ‘Directeurs de
conscience.’
15 Rachel Paine, ‘Gabrielle Suchon’s vision of the good life,’ Philosophy Lives, https://www.philosophylives.
com/essays/gabrielle-suchons-vision-of-the-good-life [accessed 11 February 2021].
16 ‘De l’autorité’, Traité, p. 28.
17 Ibid., p. 30.
18 Julie Walsh, ‘Gabrielle Suchon, Freedom and the Neutral Life,’ International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, 27.5 (2019), 685–712 (p. 687).
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breadth of material available, rather than its religious standing, appears then to be
the determining factor in Suchon’s choice of sources. This however should not
detract from the possibility that the use of religious sources, rather than a mere
strategy designed to deflect accusations of heresy, is both the essential motivation
and the principal structural authority in the Traité de la morale et de la politique.
To assess the design of Suchon’s enterprise, it is perhaps best to examine both
texts side by side. The Traité is a more clearly argumented response to the on-
going debate about women’s abilities, education and socially subservient position.
It develops in three parts, culminating in the demonstration that all other restric-
tions (lack of education and freedom) placed on women intend to deprive them
of autonomy and authority in order to maintain male power and supremacy, as
summed up in the final part of the Traité: ‘ … les hommes ne privent les personnes
du beau Sexe, des deux premiers avantages [la Liberté et le Science], que pour les
empècher de pretendre au troisième [l’Autorité].’19 We can therefore deduce from
this that Suchon sees male domination as a ‘political’ strategy and attempts to coun-
teract it by giving her female reader the arguments and practical advice necessary to
embrace their own autonomy and defend their desire to learn and to opt for a celi-
bate lifestyle if they so choose, at a time when independent women were regarded as
oddities and open to suspicion and persecution from their contemporaries, the state
and the Church.20 Suchon uses a pseudonym (Aristophile) but, while aware that
this might give her detractors some ammunition (‘Tout ce qui vient à l’esprit des
femmes étant toujours suspect à celui des hommes’), she makes it absolutely clear
in the Préface Générale that the text was written by a(n ummarried) woman
(‘C’est le travail d’une fille’). The second text, Du célibat volontaire ou La Vie
sans engagement, was published in 1700 and the title page, which indicates that
the text was written ‘Par Damoiselle Gabrielle Suchon’, makes it clear that the
author is a woman and that she is unmarried. It is also divided in three parts and
focuses more closely on both the advantages of the secular celibate life and on its
practical aspects, in particular in the ‘livre troisième’, entitled ‘L’emploi du temps,
les exercices, & les vertus les plus nécessaires aux Personnes, qui passent leur vie
sans engagement’. According to Suchon’s vision, the secular celibate, orNeutraliste,
is not called to the religious life but would remain unmarried in order to dedicate
herself to study, charitable works and contemplation. InDu célibat, she specifically
devotes chapters to the fact that having to look after children (Chapters IX, X and
XI) and manage servants (Chapters XII, XIII and XIII) constitute an obstacle to
this, while elsewhere she cites the obedience to superiors required of nuns and clau-
sura as obstacles to ‘l’emploi du temps’, and ‘les exercices’which are detailed in Part
19 ‘De l’autorité’, Traité, p. 11.
20 While the celibate life could be embraced by both men and women, it must be noted that it raises specific
issues for women, even when they were, like widows, afforded a degree of legal autonomy. As noted by
Hardwick, ‘the efforts of their male peers to resolve what they saw to be the challenges that [they] posed
to the patriarchal order, and the responses of women in this position together defined a practice of widow-
hood that could not take full advantage of the opportunities promised in the law. Widows were subject to
pressures widowers did not incur, and widows’ autonomy was continually restricted by practices that
embedded them in a network of male kin’ (p. 133). It can be safely assumed that such difficulties would
be equally present for women who never married and were granted even less autonomy by the law.
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3 of the text. The status proposed for women in Du célibat is of course predicated
on a degree of autonomy and ‘authority’ whose legitimacy has been established in
the Traité.
It should be pointed out here, as this is relevant to our understanding of the
true dimension of Suchon’s use of religious sources in her argumentation, that
she may have authored a third text, no longer extant. The only reference to
this text is from Suchon herself. She states in Chapter 22 of Du célibat on
‘l’amitié’: ‘Comme j’ai parlé de l’Amitié au troisième Tome des fidelles
Amantes de Jesus-Christ, pour remarquer les différences avec l’amour, je pas-
serai sous silence beaucoup de choses que je pourrais dire à cet endroit, de
crainte d’user de redites.’21 There is no evidence that this text was ever published
(although it was granted permission to be printed), yet Suchon appears to expect
that her reader will have read it and be cognisant of its contents.22 If we accept
the existence of this earlier volume, which presumably treats of life within a reli-
gious order, and establishes perhaps the parameters of a ‘true’ vocation (she
warns in Le Traité about vows taken too young, when one is still too immature
and uneducated to truly understand the commitment required to be a ‘good
nun’), Du célibat can then be seen as an alternative for those who are not
suited to that life rather than opposed to it. This is significant and should
inform how we view her other works and especially her use of religious texts.
If the tome did exist, then far from undermining the arguments of the Traité,
it could potentially support one of the most important aspects of it, namely
that both orders and marriage are appropriate for those genuinely called to
them, but have potentially disastrous consequences for those who are not, there-
fore making a ‘third path’ necessary for the latter to fulfil their God-given
purpose. The legitimacy and necessity of such a status are underlined by
Suchon’s assertion that ‘c’est une condition sans engagement, qui renferme
tous les autres états en puissance’.23 The above can of course only be speculative
until extant copies of the third text, if any exist, can be analysed. Yet if this is
confirmed, then Suchon’s complete works, taken in their likely order of creation,
or at least the order in which she intended them to be read (Traité de la morale et
de la politique / Traité de l’excellence de la vocation des filles / Du célibat volon-
taire) point to a strategy that aims first to offer a critical examination of the
social (rather than religious) uses of convents and an analysis of the religious jus-
tifications used to validate the subservience of women embedded in marriage,
before establishing the religious life as desirable only in the right conditions.
Having demonstrated the need for a new status, she can finally develop in the
21 Du Célibat volontaire, pp. 401–02.
22 Wallace Kirsop came across confirmation of its existence while investigating the two other texts. An entry in
the register of the Paris booksellers’ guild for 7 July 1699 indicates, ‘Damoiselle Gabrielle Suchon Nous a
presenté des Lettres de Privilege à elle accordé par sa Majesté pour faire imprimer et vendre par Charles
Cabry un Livre intitulé Traité de l’excellence de la Vocation des filles consacrées à Dieu dans le Cloitre
et de la sainteté de leurs exercices divisé en trois tomes pendant Le tems de huit annees Donné a Paris Le
4me juillet 1699 signé Boucher.’ Wallace Kirsop, ‘A note on Gabrielle Suchon’s efforts to seek publication
of her works,’ Journal of Romance Studies, 5.2 (2005), 17–18 (p. 17). Further research is required to ascer-
tain if this text was ever published but its position in Suchon’s overall project is worthy of consideration.
23 Du célibat volontaire, p. 2.
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last volume the purpose and practical dimensions of this path, one that does in
fact already exist but lacks recognition and legitimacy.24
While Suchon’s enterprise has often been perceived by some modern readers pri-
marily in the context of la défense des femmes,which may be explained by the simi-
larities found between some of Suchon’s arguments (especially on marriage and
education) and well-known pro-woman writers, such as Poulain de La Barre or
le Père Le Moyne, I would argue that the long history of difficulties experienced
by women attempting to define their own modes of worship outside the Church
(filles séculières, Béguines, Ursulines) could have had as strong an impact on
Suchon’s writing as contemporary debates of a more overtly social nature, since
she specifically comments on them in Chapter 2 of Du célibat.25 Since the
Middle Ages, women had been trying to negotiate with the Church a way to take
an active part in apostolacy, rather than being content with the passive role assigned
to them in convents. Women who, for reasons of class or money, could not enter
convents, those who felt a strong vocation to teach or care for their local commu-
nities, as well as those who did not feel up to the hardship inherent in conventual
life, had long been trying to develop ways to avoid clausura while choosing a life-
style in which spiritual issues were at the forefront and which closely resembled that
of nuns, often taking private vows of poverty and chastity. Unlike the vows taken by
nuns however, these vows could be temporary (in a similar fashion to those of the
celibacy advocated by Suchon). Clearly the fact that these women did not take
public and permanent vows constituted a problem for the Church who could not
control their mode of worship or, more worryingly, their interpretation of theolo-
gical issues. Yet for women like the Ursulines, intent on apostolacy, clausura
creates an unresolvable dilemma: ‘le choix de la religion implique l’abandon de
tout engagement avec le monde, tandis que le choix de l’action rend tout status reli-
gieux impossible.’26 The Ursulines’ insistence on a ‘vie mixte mêlée de la contempla-
tion et de l’action’27, is not dissimilar to Suchon’s insistance in Du célibat that the
neutraliste’s life should consist of both contemplation and service to the community
(Suchon herself was known to teach, for example): it seems that, like Suchon, the
Ursulines were ‘prêtes à braver l’opprobre pour se vouer à une vocation qu’elles
estiment plus sainte même que la vie monastique traditionnelle.’28 Laurence Lux-
Sterritt asserts that the main objections from the church focus on two aspects: ‘la
liberté de movement et l’interaction avec le monde.’ Similar aims for women are
24 It is of course impossible to establish with any certainty the order in which the texts were actually written:
we know that Le Traité de la Morale et de la Politique, for example, received an ‘approbation’ from J. B
Junot, Docteur de Sorbonne, on 14 October 1691, two years prior to its publication in April 1693. Accord-
ing to Bertoloni’s archival research (Sonia Bertolini, ‘Gabrielle Suchon: une vie sans engagement?’ Austra-
lian Journal of French studies, 37.3 (2000), pp. 289–308), by 1673 Suchonmay have left the convent. It is of
course possible that she worked on two or more texts concurrently, over the following twenty years or so.
This does not, however, contradict the possibility of an overarching strategy linking all three.
25 On this idea, see also passim in Julie Walsh, ‘Gabrielle Suchon’.
26 Laurence Lux-Sterritt, ‘Les religieuses en mouvement. Ursulines françaises et Dames anglaises à l’aube du
XXVIIe siècle,’ Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 52.4 (2005), 7–23 (p. 8).
27 Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne [désormais AD31], 221H-37, f. 2, Mémoires du com-
mencement et progrès de l’ordre de sainte Ursule, Cahier 1604–1621. Cited in Lux-Sterritt, p. 9.
28 Ibid., p. 8.
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articulated in the Traité where Suchon defends engagement with the world and
freedom of movement for women, not only in order to educate themselves and
serve the local community, but also in order to travel more widely:
Et comme, pour glorifier Dieu dans ses ouvrages, il faut nécessairement les voir et les
considérer, la même obligation qui [les] engage à louer le Créateur [leur] donne les
moyens qui peuvent conduire à l’accomplissement de ce devoir.29
While the above may be understood to apply in a local context, the last chapter of
‘La Liberté’ is unambiguous about the extent of this freedom, and concentrates on
the stories of ‘Plusieurs exemples des personnes du Sexe qui ont apporté beaucoup
de fruits et d’utilité par leurs voyages’.
Women professing a religious vocation but refusing to enter religious orders also
raised issues for society at large in so far as, having chosen celibacy, these women
could not be ‘controlled’ by men through marriage. Perceived as dangerously unsu-
pervised, they were derided by society and persecuted by the Church itself, who
sought to impose clausura on any community of women and strongly discouraged
imitation of religious structures in the secular world. As Elisja Schulte van Kessel
points out, ‘en fait, elles n’avaient droit de cité ni dans l’Eglise ni dans la
société.’30 It is perhaps in the problems experienced by those women in their
attempts to return to a pre-institutional mode of worship that we may find the
inspiration for Suchon’s philosophical enterprise. It is also important to note that
the notion, and terminology, of Neutralisme, are not Suchon’s own and can be
found in earlier texts, clearly suggesting that such a status, while not widely
embraced, or seen as desirable, or even acceptable, by all religious scholars and
authorities, was nonetheless accepted as legitimate by some. As I have argued else-
where, the term appears in a small but significant number of ecclesiastic writers:
such a status, and name, had previously been used most notably by Nicolas
Caussin, a Jesuit priest and moralist, referenced by name in a marginal note in
La Science (p. 252).31 This would suggest that Suchon was well aware of those
who preceded her in advocating secular celibacy and the difficulties they encoun-
tered. This, rather than the use of religious texts to detract from or give weight
to a position that would otherwise be singularly secular or unorthodox in its
genesis, would explain why religion is at the heart of her argument. Ultimately,
what emerges here is the sense of a woman struggling between her faith and
what she sees as obstacles in the fulfilment of her, and other women’s, own relation-
ship to God, and seeking in her reading and writing to find some resolution to the
tension between individual worship and the restrictions imposed by social norms.
29 ‘De la liberté’, Traité de la morale et de la politique, p. 208.
30 Elisja Schulte van Kessel, Women and Men in Spiritual Culture, XIV–XVII Centuries: A Meeting of South
and North (The Hague: Netherlands Govt. Pub. Office, 1986), p. 147.
31 See Véronique Desnain, ‘The origins of la vie neutre: Nicolas Caussin’s Influence on the writings of Gab-
rielle Suchon, French Studies, 63 (2009), 148–60. The terminology used by Suchon is therefore not quite
as original as Lisa Shapiro suggests. Lisa Shapiro, ‘Gabrielle Suchon’s “Neutralist”: The Status of
Women and the Invention of Autonomy,’ in Women and Liberty, 1600–1800, ed. by Jacqueline Broad
and Karen Detlefsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 50–65 (p. 53).
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Jeannette Geffriaud Rosso’s assertion that ‘contrairement à l’avis de tous, le
célibat apparaît, aux yeux de Gabrielle Suchon, un état privilégié’32 may,
however, be stretching the point. Firstly, as suggested above, Suchon posits le
célibat on an equal footing to the two other paths open to women rather than pre-
ferable to it. Suchon’s entire argument would collapse if le célibatwere presented as
‘privilégié’ since its very existence is predicated on a God-given vocation. It would
therefore be unsuitable to anyone called to the religious life or marriage. Secondly,
while not widespread, the recognition of the legitimacy of this status is not limited
to Caussin and Suchon: Maillard’s note on the page de garde of his Le Bon Mariage
ou le moyen d’etre heureux et faire son salut en estat de mariage (1647) suggests
that this third status, while not widespread and possibly more likely to be taken
up by men, was common enough to warrant a specific address: ‘Ceux et celles
qui font profession de célibat ou de Religion, connaitront l’usage qu’ils peuvent
avoir de ce livre en la Seconde Préface.’ Maillard, like Caussin, and of course
Suchon, places emphasis on ‘vocation’: ‘Que pour être heureux en mariage, & en
tout autre état, ne faut s’y engager sans bien connaitre que Dieu y appelle’, a idea
on which Suchon’s argument in Le Traité fully depends.33 Vocation, as a direct
and entirely individual response to God, is crucial to Suchon because it confers
legitimacy and authority.
Authority is central to Suchon’s endeavour, not only as the ultimate aim defended
by her work, but also in terms of her position as a writer. It is threatened at every turn
by the lack of legitimacy afforded women in general and women writers in particular.
Like her few predecessors (Christine de Pisan, Marie de France), Suchon takes as her
first line of defence the divine imperative: she is ‘called’, as a writer, and as a teacher,
to perform this task. Her ‘vocation’ also ensures that she has been given the qualities
required to bring her philosophical ‘mission’ to its end. For the lack of authority
granted to women by society, as opposed to that conferred by God’s design, is
also, according to Suchon, the ultimate deprivation and the one she truly aims to
challenge. As pointed out by Derval Conroy, Suchon’s argument highlights how
the deprivation of freedom and knowledge ‘makes it easier for men to keep
women in their state of dependency.’34 Knowledge then, if women are as capable
as men of acquiring it, should form the basis of any authority granted to them,
and Suchon sets out to give a magisterial demonstration of her own abilities in this
respect. The range of sources she calls upon to do so, and her engagement with
them, are in themselves part of the demonstration. Given both the importance of reli-
gious discourse on social matters relating to gender (most manuels on marriage or
female education, for example, are penned by ecclesiasts) and the efforts made by
the Church to discourage women from engaging directly with Scriptures and
32 Jeannette Geffriaud Rosso, ‘Gabrielle Suchon: une troisième voie pour la femme?,’ in Ouverture et dialo-
gue: mélanges offerts à Wolfgang Leiner, ed. by Ulrich Döring, Antiopy Lyroudias and Rainer Zaiser
(Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1988), pp. 669–78 (p. 670).
33 Claude Maillard, Le Bon Mariage ou le moyen d’etre heureux et faire son salut en estat de mariage (Paris:
Jean de Launay, 1647), p. 92.
34 Derval Conroy, ‘Gabrielle Suchon: the Politics of Exclusion,’ in Ruling Women, Vol 1:Government, Virtue
and the Female Prince in Seventeenth-Century France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 100–
17 (p. 106).
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theological discussions (including those in religious orders, who are most often given
abridged or edited versions),35 the breadth of Suchon’s reading, and especially that of
religious texts, as exemplified by her references, underlines her success as an autodi-
dact and offers proof of women’s capabilities.
Yet she goes further by positing that there should be no restrictions to the
materials from which women should seek this knowledge or the topics to which
these materials relate, and that women should do this as autonomous beings
rather than in relation to any specific status. Again this sets her apart from her pre-
decessors, including female advocates for women such as Christine de Pizan. While
some Catholic thinkers advocate for the education of women they do so in the
context of women as wives and mothers and limit that education to topics that
will enable them to perform these roles better. Yet even such limited access to edu-
cation could be seen as unacceptable by the Church: Fénelon’s treatise on girls’ edu-
cation was deemed too daring, despite his assertion that ‘La science des femmes,
comme celles des hommes, doit se borner à s’instruire par rapport à leur fonction’36,
and his concession that ‘elles ne doivent gouverner l’Etat, ni faire la guerre, ni entrer
dans le ministère des choses sacrées; ainsi elles peuvent se passer de certaines con-
naissances étendues, qui appartiennent à la politique, à l’art militaire, à la jurispru-
dence, à la philosophie et à la théologie.’37 It is worth noting that the dissention
between Fénelon and Suchon may also have a wider theological context, if we
accept Patricia Touboul’s analysis of Fénelon’s text: whereas Suchon put forward
the notion that the pursuit of knowledge and the development of intellectual qual-
ities and skills for their own sake are divinely dictated, Fénelon’s premise is that the
acquisition of knowledge is not an end in itself:
[…] car il ne s’agit pas, dans l’idéal que revendique Fénelon, de rechercher le savoir pour
lui-même et, par conséquent, de se livrer à l’étude comme si elle était une fin en soi: l’ex-
ercice de la raison n’est donc pas, en soi-même, un bienfait. Personne, en ce sens, ne
devrait se prétendre savant, comme s’il s’agissait là d’une occupation qui, en tant que
telle, méritait d’être recherchée. Il est donc indigne de l’homme, créature de Dieu, et
image de la perfection divine, de se livrer à cette forme d’activité gratuite, vaine
plutôt que véritablement libre. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de plaindre les filles – préoccupées
par les tâches pratiques et utilitaires du foyer – d’en être privées. Au contraire, tous,
hommes et femmes, doivent travailler, et nul ne doit revendiquer cette forme de
liberté, comme absence totale de contrainte, qui serait figurée par le loisir à l’état pur.38
35 The Council of Trent (1545–63) not only insisted on the rules of enclosure for women, but also, in response
to Protestantism and its acceptance of lay preachers, set out restrictive parameters for the interpretations of
Scriptures, limiting them largely to ordained members of the Church, parameters which de facto excluded
women. In this instance, unlike on other topics, such as the validity of the celibate status, Suchon diverges
from the canons of Trent and is closer to contemporary developments, which sees the publication of a
number of treatises, often written by men of the cloth, that advocate scriptural reading for the laity, includ-
ing women. It is worth noting then that her choice of arguments and sources appears to be dictated by their
effectiveness in serving her aims and arguments rather than any hierarchy of orthodoxy.
36 Fénelon, Traité de l’éducation des filles (Paris: Klincksieck, 1994), p. 85.
37 Ibid., p. 37.
38 Patricia Touboul, ‘Le Statut des femmes: nature et condition sociale dans Le Traité de L’éducation des Filles
de Fénelon,’ Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, 104.2 (2004), 325–42 (p. 336).
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Suchon however suggests that all knowledge is worthwhile. To justify her call for an
education for women which would be equal in its breadth to that received by men,
she relies on the Cartesian model of the separation between body and mind, arguing
that God’s commandment ‘de remplir la terre et de l’assujettir, fut pour Eve aussi
bien que pour Adam, à qui le Seigneur donna une compagne et une associée, et
non pas une servante ni une esclave, parce que la différence n’est qu’aux Sexes, et
non aux Esprits.’39
Her active engagement with the texts to which she refers and the variety of topics
she covers, including rhetoric, the sciences and history, could therefore be seen as a
demonstration of women’s ability to acquire knowledge, and use it appropriately.
Michèle Le Dœuff suggests that Suchon’s own rhetoric and use of sources is a
form of internal dialogue (‘in both her books Suchon herself produces objections
to her theories and then refutes these very objections’) and argues that ‘Suchon’s
practice of philosophical reasoning in fact fits in with what Plato called ‘thinking’.40
Thus,
with Gabrielle Suchon’s notion of autodidactism, as connected – first of all – to reading
books, we can say that her solitary dialogue with herself also included a conversation
with both past and contemporary authors. […] Books here stand in a role previously
held by handsome Meno, promising Theaetetus, pompous Protagoras and all others.
Books from which one can learn a lot, but in a critical mode, which means that one
can also take issue with some of their contents.41
This notion of an inner philosophical debate also resonates when we consider
Suchon’s use of religious texts, be they patristic or modern. She brings these
voices together and lets them, within a structured framework, respond to each
other. She also finds in some of them, such as Caussin’s, a rationalisation of her
own trajectory as a former nun who, in a newfound secular life, must defend her
right to autonomy.42 It is in this juxtaposition of a multitude of views, and
Suchon’s assessment and manipulation of these views that her originality resides.
As Le Dœuff argues:
When past philosophical texts are reread by a mind which can think, in dialogue with
itself, which can work and include the feelings and the affections of the heart in the
work, then of course a discontinuity will take place, perhaps as small as the deviation
Lucretuis called clinamen, but sufficient to create, in the end, a brand new world; in
Suchon’s case a new decipherment of the world as it was, a new set of ethical values,
or rather a new art of deciphering the existing world from a point of view determined
by those values.43
Furthermore, beyond this ‘dialogue’ with a wide variety of texts, from which it
would seem odd to exclude the religious texts which are such an integral part of
39 Traité, ‘De l’autorité,’ p. 7.
40 Michèle Le Dœuff, ‘Women in dialogue and in solitude,’ Journal of Romance Studies, 5.2 (2005), 1–15
(p. 10.)
41 Ibid.
42 On autonomy, see Shapiro, ‘Gabrielle Suchon’s “Neutralist.”’
43 Le Dœuff, ‘Women in dialogue and in solitude,’ p.12.
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contemporaneous discourse on gender, Suchon’s break with tradition can also be
found in her intended readership. While her work is dedicated to the Holy
Trinity, it has, Le Dœuff suggests:
a clearly acknowledged ambition: to wake women from their slumber, to invite them to
read and become self-taught and establish small societies to argue with one another, and
exercise their own free minds this way. […]
[T]he major discontinuity she introduced […] is to be found in the fact that she focused
on solitary work, but with a not-yet-existing community in view, women readers, whom
she invited to liberate themselves. It is, in itself, a remarkable discontinuity, however
much she borrowed from the tradition she claimed as her heritage.44
Indeed, for Elsa Dorlin, it is specifically the originality of Suchon’s project which
dictates its form:
Elle a conscience que la façon dont elle va aborder la question de la liberté de la femme
est tout à fait originale. C’est pourquoi elle opte pour un style d’exposition et une forme
d’argumentation très classique.45
To this, we could perhaps add the range of references she uses to develop her argu-
ment, one that appears, on the surface, extremely traditional, but used in a way that
belies its ‘fidéisme’. She relies heavily on classical and biblical texts and those are
generally clearly indicated by margin notes, often giving chapter and verse refer-
ences. She quotes the Scriptures, in particular the Old Testament, the Book of Eccle-
siasticus, the Fathers of the Church (especially Saint Augustine, Saint Jerome, Saint
John Chrysostom and Saint Thomas), as well as the Ancients: Juvenal, Pliny,
Cicero, Aristotle, Plutarch and Plato.46 Whether her reliance on such ancient and
respected sources can be regarded as a mark of fideism and an obstacle to a truly
original and political outlook is highly questionable given the way she deploys
them.
Her use of patristic writings follows the pattern that opposes different sources,
but also, most crucially, different texts from the same source to highlight inconsis-
tencies. Saint Augustine, for example, is often cited but in his vast corpus – he
authored 93 books, while over 300 of his letters and over 600 of his sermons are
still extant – both charges against and defences of women can be found in his
writing.47 It is easy therefore to attribute arguments to refute or support either
side of the debate about women to him and Suchon clearly manipulates this
44 Ibid.
45 Elsa Dorlin, ‘Gabrielle Suchon, une philosophie de liberté,’ at ‘Philosophie et libération des femmes. Journée
de la Philosophie à l’Unesco, 3’. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001460/146018fo.pdf, pp. 15–22
(p. 17).
46 See Hélène Michon, ‘La lecture de la Bible par les femmes: l’apologie d’Antoine Arnauld et de Gabrielle
Suchon,’ in Les Femmes et la Bible de la fin du Moyen Age à l’époque moderne, ed. by Élise Boillet and
Maria-Teresa Ricci (Paris: Champion, 2017), pp. 107–22 for a brief discussion of this. On the intellectual
pursuits of women within the Church and the accessibility of religious texts to women, see the excellent and
very thorough study by Linda Timmermans, L’Accès des femmes à la culture sous l’Ancien Régime (Paris:
Champion, 2005).
47 See Tarsicius J. van Bavel, ‘Augustine’s View on Women,’ Augustiniana, 39 (1989), 5–53.
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wealth for her own purpose. Saint Paul is also used in this way. In 1 Cor 11:7, he
states that man was the image and glory of God, while woman was the glory of
man, while in I Timothy 2, he argues that women were created second, sinned
first, and should keep silent. He was troubled by the social implications of Chris-
tians adopting a celibate lifestyle, something that clearly cannot be reconciled
with Suchon’s project. Yet, as shown by his epistles, he approved of women speak-
ing in Christian worship assemblies, leading local churches, and travelling as evan-
gelists, and Suchon quotes abundantly from those very passages. Conversely, many
attacks against women can also be found in Saint Jerome but he saw celibacy as a
way for women to overcome their ‘inferiority’: ‘You have with you one who was
once your partner in the flesh but is now your partner in the spirit; once your
wife but now your sister; once a woman but now a man; once an inferior but
now an equal. Under the same yoke as you she hastens toward the same heavenly
kingdom’ (Letter 71 ‘To Lucinius’).48 It is obvious that such a stance supports
Suchon’s argument for celibacy outside the Church, a choice often denigrated by
the Church itself in its attempts to curb secular religious movements that it saw
as a threat to its own authority.49 Suchon therefore calls on Ancient sources in
order to put forward notions that could be seen as dangerous or heretical by con-
temporary religious institutions; she plays one authority against another, or,
shrewdly, shows the contradictions and evolutions apparent within a single
author’s production, hence suggesting that what is temporarily perceived as truth
may change over time. The criteria for selecting a particular authority or text
does not seem to be their perceived level of orthodoxy, but rather how well the
point, or indeed the contradictions, which she brings to the fore serve her argument.
Within this stratagem, there is no significant difference in the way she uses secular
and religious sources.
Suchon is therefore clearly selective in her choice and use of quotations, and her
reliance on sources respected by her peers, far from being a mere craven attempt at
validation, can indeed be seen as strategic, with the author deliberately choosing
arguments from the very same sources used by the detractors of women to
expose their inconsistencies, situate them in the context of their time and perhaps
show that even famous detractors of women have at times been forced to recognise
their intellectual and spiritual qualities. As pointed out by Conroy:
like Gournay, Suchon appropriates, and hence situates herself within, a paradigm of male
hegemonic discourse, drawing on both ancients and moderns, in her use of scriptural,
patristic, classical and modern writings. In this counter-cultural reading of traditional
sources, which Suchon explicitly justifies, – one that is not always unproblematic, to
say the least – the two female thinkers can be seen to participate in the creation of an
alternative female tradition of interpretation, a pro-woman hermeneutics.50
48 http://www.tertullian.org/fathers2/NPNF2-06/Npnf2-06-03.htm#P3043_802029 [accessed 17 March
2021].
49 For details of this, see, for example, Elizabeth Rapley, The Dévotes: Women and Church in Seventeenth-
Century France (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); Évelyne Berriot-Salva-
dore, Les Femmes dans la société française de la Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1990), pp. 306–22.
50 Conroy, p. 102.
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The novelty of this approach should not be underestimated and sets Suchon apart
from preceding discourse on women, which broadly constitutes the Querelle des
femmes, with which she has occasionally been associated. Far from being a
slavish ‘listing’ of arguments and counter-arguments such as have appeared
throughout theQuerelle, Suchon’s work engages in an active and meticulous exam-
ination and critique of these arguments. While Suchon’s work draws upon many of
the tropes and methods of the querelle – the Cartesian approach of Poullain, the
recueils de femmes illustres popular throughout the seventeenth century, the
manuels destined for women in marriage and convents – both her critical approach
(and it is perhaps in her complex engagement with religious texts that this is most
obvious) and the fact that she directs her writing at a female reader and envisages
this reader as an autonomous individual rather than as a woman with a specific role
to play in society, are features that set her apart from this tradition.
She is also keenly aware of, and criticises, the importance of the stylistic features
which dominated such debates. For if Suchon may seem to represent the ‘arrière
garde’ of the Querelle, she does not in fact share its aims, which often had little
to do with an actual desire for social change, or indeed female solidarity.51 Texts
written by men for a male audience are sometimes little more than an opportunity
for the author to display their rhetorical and literary skills, to the extent that, as
Suchon herself notes in the Préface to her Traité, that the ‘effets de plume’
become far more important that the topic addressed. In clear opposition to this,
Suchon highlights, in the Préface to the Traité, the simplicity and educational
value of her own writing. Her reliance on a multitude of sources, and the provision
of marginal notes clearly identifying those sources is also a way to point her reader
towards further study, or to counter the dearth of texts available to her. It is indeed
crucial to underline that Suchon’s project is consciously instructive: as mentioned
above, her intended reader is female and as such, she would not necessarily have
access to the texts to which Suchon refers in their entirety and may only be cogni-
sant of the arguments provided by those who would use them to justify her subjec-
tion. By juxtaposing conflicting authorities, Suchon, again, makes a point about the
subjectivity of accepted knowledge and provides her reader with counter-argu-
ments, from equally authoritative sources, to the ones that reader may have come
across in her own, perhaps more limited, reading.52
What Suchon’s use of religious sources clearly shows is that, for her, authority
should derive from truth and logic, and that truth can only be perceived by exam-
ining all facets of a single argument. By showing the fallibility and paradoxes of
even the most respected authorities, and placing them in their historical and geo-
graphical context, Suchon shows that knowledge is not static and establishes that
the development of intellectual abilities and the acquisition of knowledge though
all available means are the sine qua non conditions of understanding and fulfilling
51 See, for example, Ian MacLean,Woman Triumphant: Feminism in French Literature, 1610–1652 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977), esp. chapter 2, pp. 25–63; Madeleine Lazard, Les Avenues de fémynie: les femmes
et la Renaissance (Paris: Fayard, 2001).
52 A review of Du célibat in Nouvelles de la République des lettres (May 1700) notes ‘Elle met à profit ses
lectures dans tout cet ouvrage, et elle cite Les Pères et divers autres ouvrages que peu de personnes de
son sexe connaissent’ (my emphasis) (p. 583).
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God’s design as an individual. Suchon proves, through her own example, the ‘capa-
cité’ of an individual woman to do this, and by extension the potential of all
women, even as social norms put every possible obstacle in her way. The very exist-
ence of the text is evidence of the truth it seeks to demonstrate.
It is clear, of course, that Suchon is aware that the change necessary to enable all
women to aspire to such knowledge, freedom and authority will not come quickly,
and most certainly not in her lifetime:
Ce ne sont pas les femmes de ce temps qui entreprendront jamais de déposséder les
hommes de leur puissance & Autorité, parce que ce serait un égarement d’esprit de pré-
tendre à des choses moralement impossibles.53
I would argue that, in contrast with the legal rights for women that Suchon may
hope for in the distant future, she believes that her writing will, in the short term,
enable women to develop their own intellectual skills and autonomy to face the
struggle against the ‘projet politique de domination masculine’54 with self-respect
and fortitude.55 The mere fact of convincingly exposing the fallacy of ‘natural’
female inferiority can be seen as a powerful act of revolt in itself. Ronzeaud con-
cludes his defense of Suchon with the words:
Et il nous semble, en dernière analyse, qu’elle n’a rien d’une prosélyte de l’immobilisme
et que, si l’acte d’écrire à un sens à ses yeux, c’est bien celui d’ouvrir les yeux des autres,
de donner à voir l’injustice et non d’enseigner la soumission.56
Even more remarkably, as Dorlin points out, the way in which she does this has
implications well beyond her main topic:
Avec Gabrielle Suchon, la critique de l’inégalité des sexes devient le cas d’école de toute
critique sociale de l’iniquité du pouvoir. Dans ces conditions, c’est bien un appel à la
résistance auquel nous invite Gabrielle Suchon.57
The fact that Suchon relies on orthodox texts and authors to make this ‘appel à la
résistance’, far from undermining her project, serves it. By using the same sources as
had been used to bolster ‘l’iniquité du pouvoir’, she effectively demonstrates the
way in which such sources had been used selectively to support and justify male
hegemony both within and beyond the church.
Suchon’s entirely reasonable assumption that the change she advocates will not
happen overnight does not necessarily negate her belief that it will happen, not
least perhaps because she sees such change as a return to God’s true design. The
reference to the rise of the Amazons, as one of the ‘merveilles’ which show that
God can perform miracles, hints that the impediment is only ‘moralement imposs-
ible’ in a secular context. In other words, such a change within her own time would
be nothing less than a miracle, because of the political opposition to it from men,
53 ‘Avant-Propos,’ in ‘De l’autorité,’ Traité.
54 Ronzeaud, p. 277.
55 In this context, her recourse to examples of femmes fortes could be seen not as mere compliance to tradition
but as a conscious desire to replace women in a female genealogy of which they can find pride and strength.
56 Ronzeaud, p. 277.
57 Dorlin, ‘Gabrielle Suchon, une philosophie de liberté,’ p. 19.
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but it should not be perceived as going against God’s will since it is this divine will
that has given women the necessary qualities to achieve this. It is possible then that
the reliance on religious texts also serves to reassure her female reader that seeking
freedom, knowledge and authority does not equate with heresy. The fact that her
female contemporaries have little chance of achieving the kind of freedom
Suchon advocates certainly does not negate her belief in the eventual advent of
equality. On the contrary, Suchon’s work could be perceived as a conscious
attempt to arm her followers for the battle that must take place before their
rights are finally recognised. The final words of the Avant-propos certainly hint
at such a conclusion but also emphasize that, should this become reality, it will,
in fact, be attributable to divine will:
Car il [Dieu] peut élever le pauvre de la terre et le mettre au rang des Princes de son
peuple, pour lui donner le siège de gloire & le faire participer de son héritage.58
However, Suchon is not prepared to rely solely on divine intervention and she pos-
itions herself as an instrument of God’s will. Her treatises not only serve as a com-
pendium of arguments and counter-arguments which can enable women to
answer their critics; they are also the spark which will ignite women’s desire to
‘better themselves’, to shake them out of the apathy which their unfair subjection,
and especially their lack of education, has created. As she states in the Préface
générale:
Le Traité de ces trois choses est une entreprise aussi nécessaire & utile, que laborieuse et
délicate, à cause que la plus grande partie des femmes s’imaginent que ces états de con-
trainte, d’ignorantes, & de sujettes leur sont si naturels, que leurs souffrances ne
peuvent jamais recevoir de remède. Plusieurs les prennent d’une manière si peu élevée
que souvent la simplicité de leur esprit ne les abaisse pas moins, que les lois et les cou-
tumes introduites à leur désavantage.
The first step in fighting oppression is therefore to convince the oppressed that their
condition is unjust and can be changed.
It should be no surprise then that religious texts and theological debates occupy
such a large part of Suchon’s developing argument and are intertwined with more
practical issues, since such debates have potentially wide-ranging repercussions
for social organisation. The two are linked on a fundamental level and cannot
be separated, as clearly exemplified by the religious arguments brought to bear
in the wider debate regarding female education. Her defense of women is there-
fore based on an opposition between the secular and the divine, including
within religious literature, the evolution of social mores and the immutability of
divine purpose, what can be changed (laws, customs) and what must be accepted
(God’s will). She consistently treads a fine line between orthodoxy and spiritual
rebellion since her apparent submission to the church’s edicts (on women
hearing confession, as shown above for example) is at odds with her insistence
on female intellectual, physical and spiritual independence. So while religion,
and most importantly the way religious texts have been interpreted, lies at the
58 ‘Avant-Propos’, in ‘De l’autorité,’ Traité.
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heart of Suchon’s work, it is with a very critical and individualistic stance that she
approaches the issues it raises.
Suchon’s use of religious sources is not intrinsically incompatible with her dis-
course on female freedom and should not detract from the radical propositions
she makes or from her powerful denunciation of male hegemony. While it is
true that she clearly, and no doubt realistically, had few illusions about the like-
lihood of her proposals being uncritically embraced or implemented by her con-
temporaries, her strong belief that her view would eventually prevail may well
have been bolstered by the fact that her faith was genuine. Her writing can
perhaps only be fully understood if we accept its religious, as well as social and
literary, roots. In this context, Suchon’s insistence on the vocational can be seen
as a reflection of both her spiritual belief and her political project, even when
she does not explicitly refer to the wider secular implications of such a stance.
It is unlikely, however, that she would not have considered them: her chapters
on ‘des loix’ (L’Autorité, Troisième partie, chapters 5 and 6) clearly express her
belief that laws based on custom can, and should, be challenged and disobeyed
when necessary.
Dorlin highlights the innovative attempt made by Suchon to demand an égalité
de droit based on an égalité de fait but I would argue that this distinction cannot
be based only, as Dorlin implies, on ‘une problématique du vrai et du démon-
trable’.59 In order to see beyond the apparent paradoxes of her rhetoric, it is
crucial to recognise that the root of Suchon’s argument is her conviction that
this equality is God-given. This is clearly established by Auffret in her introduc-
tion to her edition of the first part of Suchon’s first treatise, in which she describes
Suchon as ‘une béate, une mystique dont la piété s’insurge contre toute contrainte
instituée.’60 Auffret therefore fully acknowledges the importance of faith as a
motivating force in Suchon’s project and insists that to consider her strictly in
the context of ‘feminist trends’ popular at the time would be wrongly reductive.
Nonetheless, as Bertolini points out, positioning her as ‘une mystique’ may be
overstating the case.61 She might be more convincingly labelled a ‘dévote’, in
the mould of those defined by Elizabeth Rapley in chapter 4 of her book:
‘deeply religious women, very often unmarried, and with time and leisure to
devote themselves to the exercise of piety.’62
Suchon believes that the submission demanded of women is not only unfair but
also heretical and an obstacle to their spiritual well-being, as well as being detri-
mental to society as a whole. Her writing sets out not only to prove this but also to
give women the means to fight those who, under the guise of orthodoxy or
custom, would deny them this ‘perfection’. As she states in the Préface Générale
of Le Traité:
59 Elsa Dorlin, L’Evidence de l’égalité des sexes: Une philosophie oubliée du XVIIe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2000), p. 33.
60 Gabrielle Suchon, Traité de la morale et de la Politique: La Liberté, ed. by Séverine Auffret (Paris: des
femmes, 1988), p. 23.
61 Bertolini, p. 302.
62 Rapley, p. 6.
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Mais comme dans la société civile et chrétienne il y a du bien à faire comme du mal à
éviter; étant ignorantes, captives et abaissées, elles sont privées d’une infinité de
moyens par lesquels elles pourraient procurer la gloire de Dieu.
With this, she positions herself as a defender of women, but equally as a defender of
the true divine purpose.
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